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Seminar: 08-350-M5c-3 Distributive Politics - Details

Seminar: 08-350-M5c-3 Distributive Politics - Details

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General information

Course name Seminar: 08-350-M5c-3 Distributive Politics
Subtitle
Course number 08-350-M5c-3
Semester SoSe 2025
Current number of participants 17
expected number of participants 30
Home institute Politik
Courses type Seminar in category Teaching
First date Wednesday, 09.04.2025 08:00 - 10:00, Room: UNICOM 3.3390 (SOCIUM - Mary-Somerville-Str. 3)
Type/Form
Englischsprachige Veranstaltung Ja
Veranstaltung für ältere Erwachsene Yes
Anzahl ältere Erwachsene 4

Module assignments

Comment/Description

Distributive politics characterize income redistribution and the allocation of public goods and services (e. g. health care, education, social security, but also particularistic goods) to individuals or groups and are based on taxes and transfers. Wealth and resources are unequally distributed in society. The question that distributive politics consequently address asks: who gets what, who benefits – who loses? Distributive politics illustrate the very heart of politics and a vibrant field of research which just gained new momentum in the last years. We will study principles of resource allocation from political actors (parties) to individuals (voters), considering the electoral payoff for political parties and voters. Which groups are targeted by political parties with public goods provision: core or swing voters, the rich or the poor, the median voter or particular groups (clients), the winning coalition or the selectorate? Do voters respond to non-programmatic inducements such as vote buying? When does income inequality lead to upheaval and regime change? We will start with the discussion of classical concepts and theories in comparative political economy before we move towards the analysis of current issues in this field of research in the course of the seminar.
Distributive politics refer to two central aspects in the political sphere: 1) political accountability and 2) political responsiveness. The first aspect studies how far voters are able to hold political actors accountable for their actions and, thus, takes into account the political consequences of distributive politics (e. g. political survival, distributive conflict). The latter considers the redistributive effect of distributive politics. Do these policies reflect the demand of the voters (mostly, the median voter) or rather particular groups, and do they maximize welfare? We will start with the clarification of classical concepts, such as core and swing voters, and theories of distributive politics (I). In section II we study income inequality and distributive conflicts that emerge from unequal distribution of wealth, finding out which incentives are at work at the individual level to either push for or against redistribution. We investigate micro theories on redistribution in democratic and non-democratic countries and tease out the important role of regime type. In section III we move on to distributive politics that are based on favoritism (political clientelism) and voter intimidation. Here, we study the effects of vote buying on political accountability and political participation with a particular focus on the case of Argentina and we investigate the redistributive effects of clientelistic resource allocation regarding electoral outcomes for the incumbent and the quality of democracy in general. Finally, we will delve into the new research field on voter intimidation (through violence and coercion) as an electoral strategy to influence voting behavior looking at field experiments for the case of Nigeria and the politician’s incentive for the case of electoral intimidation in Imperial Germany.

Preparatory Reading:
Przeworski, A., Stokes, S. and Manin, B. (1999) Democracy, Accountability and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2005) The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S. I. (2007) Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Assignments and Credits:
6 CP: Term paper
3 CP: In-class presentation and written report of presentation topic

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